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3To the Last Canadian?
Casualties in 21st Army Group
Terry Copp
When Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy was assessed 
before publication the commentators 
were particularly unhappy with the 
historiographical summary which 
challenged the received version of 
combat effectiveness in Normandy. 
No one offered serious criticism of 
the evidence; it was the tone that 
concerned them. My autobiographical 
comment about Clausewitz that as “a 
social historian escaping a world 
dominated by Marxists I was entitled 
to be suspicious of yet another 19th 
century authority figure” was not well 
received. To follow this with pointed 
criticism of C.P. Stacey and John A. 
English not to mention Carlo D’Este 
and Max Hastings was considered 
ill-mannered and presumptuous. 
After publication the book received 
a number of favourable reviews as 
well as some sharply critical ones. 
The focus of these critiques was 
my rejection of the notions that the 
German army in Normandy had 
demonstrated consistent “tactical 
superiority” and the last paragraph 
of my conclusion which read: 
The Canadian citizen army that 
fought in the Battle of Normandy 
played a role all out of proportion 
to its relative strength among the 
Allied armies. This was especially 
true within 21st Army Group where, 
due to a mixture of Canadian pride, 
and the British desire to limit their 
own casualties, Canadian divisions 
were required to fight more often 
than their British counterparts. 
The oft-quoted statistics, which 
show that the Canadians suffered 
considerably heavier casualties than 
other divisions in 21 Army Group, 
are the product of a greater number of 
days in close combat with the enemy, 
not evidence of operational or tactical 
failure. Perhaps it is time to recognize 
the extraordinary achievements 
that marked the progress of the 
Canadians across Normandy’s fields 
of fire. 1
 I wish to provide in this paper a 
detailed analysis of casualties in 21st 
Army Group which will substantiate 
the argument made in Fields of Fire. 
Before I take you through the hard 
evidence I want to offer a brief 
history of the formation of both the 
combat effectiveness and casualty 
rate hypotheses. 
 A number of years ago my 
longtime friend Jack Granatstein 
provided readers of the Toronto Star 
with an account of what he called 
the left-wing takeover of social 
labour history in Canada. The article, 
title “No Hostages taken in war 
between historians” noted that Terry 
Copp “left the field in disgust after 
full-fledged assaults from Marxist 
historians.” All of this came as a 
surprise to me. I was unaware of any 
full-fledged assaults though I did 
recall that two of the leading leftists, 
Greg Kealey and Brian Palmer, had 
called me a “corporate liberal.” At 
the time I had taken this as evidence 
that they had actually read and 
understood The Anatomy of Poverty 
and recognized my centrist, income-
redistribution bias. 
 Whi le  work on industr ia l 
unionism in the 1940s was interesting 
to me, the truth is that the purpose 
had been to lay the foundation for 
a sequel to The Anatomy of Poverty 
examining the prosperity of the 
1940s and 1950s. Success stories 
about capitalism were not a popular 
subject among academics in the 1970s 
so I was open to the suggestion that 
with a sabbatical coming up I should 
consider a project with my friend 
and mentor Robert Vogel, a military 
historian at McGill University. One 
attraction was exchanging time 
in labour archives in places like 
Hull, Detroit and New Jersey, for 
France, Belgium and Holland. In 
the spring of 1981 my wife and I 
made our first visit to the Second 
World War battlefields. Experience 
as an officer cadet in the Canadian 
Officers’ Training Corps during my 
undergraduate years had given me an 
unfashionable but very real respect 
AbstrAct: In Normandy, Canadian infantry 
divisions suffered a higher rate of 
casualties than British divisions engaged 
in similar operations. These figures 
have been used by some historians to 
prove Canadian failure on the battlefield. 
However, by using statistics gathered by 
operational research scientists during 
the war, this article shows that the 
“considerably heavier casualties” suffered 
by the Canadians in Normandy and beyond 
were the product of a greater number of 
days in close combat with the enemy, not 
evidence of operational inexperience or 
tactical failure. 
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4for the Canadian army but I had not 
read much military history. I decided 
to go and see the battlefields before 
I began to write about them. At the 
time, Bob Vogel and I were focused 
on the battle for the approaches to 
Antwerp and despite constant rain 
my wife and I spent a week walking 
the ground. I defy anyone with an 
open mind who visits the Leopold 
Canal or Woensdrecht ridge to 
come away without developing a 
profound respect for the men who 
fought to overcome their enemy 
in such terrain. The ground, as my 
students have heard me say so often, 
must be the military historians’ basic 
primary source. When I learned 
from military historians that the 
attacker was supposed to have 
at least 3:1 odds to overcome the 
defender and calculated that in the 
Scheldt, the ratio was seldom better 
than 1.5:1 my skepticism about 
German combat effectiveness versus 
Canadian inexperience became the 
basis of a research question which 
I have argued in a number of books 
and articles. A second research 
question, the one we are focusing 
on today, also developed out of my 
interest in the battles in the Scheldt 
Estuary.
 My uncle Douglas “Paddy” 
Copp, who had served as a company 
sergeant-major in the British 52nd 
Lowland Division, had a number of 
stories about his wartime experience 
including strong views about the 
Canadians he had met in Holland. 
He thought they were undisciplined, 
dirty, tough, accomplished soldiers 
who were, by late October 1944, 
in very rough shape. He could not 
understand why his full-strength, 
highly trained division had sat out 
the war in Scotland and was even 
at this late date used so sparingly 
in the struggle to open Antwerp. 
In Cinderella Army I sketched the 
tension between the Canadians and 
Scots which my uncle described and 
archival sources confirmed. I was able 
to establish that after 52nd Division’s 
role in the deception operation 
“Fortitude North,” an attack on 
Norway, ended, and its second role 
as an air transportable division was 
discarded with the failure at Arnhem, 
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke wanted 
to save the division for the Far East. 
In fact, in October 1944 Brooke also 
asked Montgomery to return 3rd 
British Infantry Division, a regular 
division, to the UK for use in Burma. 
Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery 
persuaded him to leave 3rd Division 
and send 52nd to the continent, but 
the Far East, the Mediterranean and 
post-war occupation issues loomed 
large in Churchill and Brooke’s 
calculations.2
 When I read this exchange in 
the Alanbrooke Papers some of my 
innocence about British war-time 
goals disappeared but it was not 
until much later when I was trying 
to get background on Operation 
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Canadian casualties in Normandy along the road to Bretteville-sur-Laize, 9 August 1944.
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5“Wallstreet,” the plan to cross 
the Rhine at Arnhem in February 
1945 that I began to wonder if a 
pattern was emerging.3 General G.H. 
Macmillan, the commander of 49th 
West Riding Division, had developed 
“Wallstreet,” and convinced Simonds 
of its merits but Montgomery was not 
interested. My interviews, especially 
with Brigadier Trevor Hart Dyke, 
a former battalion commander in 
49th Division, suggested that the 
officers of 49th Division could not 
understand why they spent most of 
the war holding quieter sections of 
the line or conforming to the advance 
of other formations during offensive 
action.4
 Further research in British sources 
indicated that in Normandy the 53rd 
Welsh Division played a holding 
role except for a very brief period in 
August. Other British divisions also 
experienced prolonged stretches of 
relative inactivity, at least in contrast 
to the Canadian experience. During 
the struggle to close the Falaise 
and Trun-Chambois gap, British 
divisions, in a position to intervene 
decisively, were ordered to keep out 
of the messy business of trapping 
a German army so that they could 
concentrate on preparation for the 
advance to the Seine and the Rhine.5
 This kind of evidence is what led 
me to argue that the “considerably 
heavier casualties” suffered by the 
Canadians in Normandy and beyond 
were the product of a greater number 
of days in close combat with the 
enemy, not evidence of operational 
inexperience or tactical failure. Now 
thanks to Army Operational Research 
Group Report 21/54 “Battle Wastage 
Rates of Personnel in War,” I am able 
to fully document this contention. 
The report, from the Ronnie Shephard 
Operational Research Archives at the 
Laurier Centre for Military Strategic 
and Disarmament Studies, will be 
published in full in the near future 
with an appropriate introduction.6 
 The Army Operational Research 
Group produced their study in 
1946 to provide “a reliable means 
of forecasting battle and non-battle 
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The Canadian War Cemetery at Beny-sur-Mer, France. This cemetery contains the bodies of over 2,000 Canadians
who were killed in on D-Day and in the battles which lead to the capture of Caen in early July 1944.
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6wastage under varying military 
conditions.” During the war both 
the British and Canadian armies 
had used tables of wastage rates 
developed by Major-General Evett 
who in turn had created wastage 
table based on Great War experience. 
These tables expressed “wastage as a 
percentage of strength lost per thirty 
days of activity at Intense, Normal, 
and Quiet levels.” Intense rates were 
defined as “at least one battalion 
engaged in full scale defensive or 
offensive fighting.”7 I have used these 
criteria to add the data on Canadian 
casualties suffered under “intense” 
conditions.
 Our concern today is with the 
data on infantry division casualties 
i n  N o r t h w e s t  E u r o p e  w h i c h 
Field Marshal Montgomery had 
drawn attention to in his Memoirs. 
Montgomery’s table of “Cumulative 
Casualties by Divisions, 6 June to 1 
October 1944,” revealed that “3rd 
Canadian Infantry Division had more 
casualties than any other division in 
the army group and the 2nd Canadian 
Division was next.”  8 C.P. Stacey 
who presented this information in 
the context of his criticism of the 
performance of Canadian formations 
did not consider evidence about the 
number of days divisions spent in 
intense combat and his views have 
continued to influence historians.9 
Table 1 contains information that 
might be of interest. 
 The operational research group 
recognized that British divisions were 
not committed to many significant 
offensive or defensive operations 
between 1 October and 30 December 
1944 so they combined the three 
month period into a single table. The 
43rd Division with seven days of 
intense combat was the most heavily 
committed with 3rd British at five 
days second. Table 2 compares the 
British and Canadian experience for 
those three months.
 The data presented today is 
incomplete, particularly with regard 
to casualty rates under “normal” 
conditions. In July and August 1944, 
especially during what I have termed 
the stalemate, casualties suffered 
while in “normal” contact with the 
enemy, without significant offensive 
or defensive actions, accounted for 
30 percent of all casualties. There 
are other limitations including the 
exclusion of exhaustion casualties 
from the totals but I think there is 
enough evidence to substantiate my 
statement that casualties are closely 
related to the number of days spent 
in close combat and to explain why 
I continue to argue that the heavier 
casualties suffered by Canadian 
divisions in 1944 are the result of 
a greater number of days in close 
combat with the enemy, not evidence 
of operational or tactical failure.
Notes
This is a revised text of Terry Copp’s 
presentation to the 19th Military History 
Colloquium at University of Waterloo, May 
2008.
1. Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians 
in Normandy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2003), p.267.
2.  Lord Alanbrooke Papers,  Liddell 
Hart Archives, correspondence with 
Montgomery, September-October 1945. 
3.  The background to Operation Wallstreet 
is sketched in Terry Copp, Cinderella 
Army: The Canadian Army in Northwest 
Europe, 1944-1945 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2006), pp.213-214.
4.  Interview notes, Terry Copp with 
Brigadier Trevor Hart Dyke, Sheffield, 
England, July 1986.
5.  Copp, Fields of Fire, p.265.
6.  The report may also be found in the The 
National Archives (Public Record Office), 
WO 291/1482.
7.  I have used the definition of intense 
combat employed by the OR team 
eliminating any days of combat which 
fell just short of the criteria.
8. Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs 
of Field Marshal Montgomery (New York: 
Signet, 1959), p.277.
9. C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign: The 
Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-
1945 (Ottawa: National Defence, 1960), 
p.271.
Table 1
Intense Combat Days and Casualties, by Infantry Division
6 June to 30 September 1944
 Division
Days in Intense Combat Total 
Casualties
Casualties 
per DayJune July Aug Sept Total
3rd 7 8 6 1 22 7,342 333
15th 7 6 6 8 27 7,601 281
43rd 2 10 8 4 24 7,605 316
49th 5 0 1 2 8 5,894 736
50th 8 4 3 0 15 6,701 446
51st 5 3 8 2 18 4,799 266
53rd 0 0 5 5 10 4,984 498
3rd Cdn 6 7 8 10 31 9,263 298
2nd Cdn 0 8 15 7 30 8,211 273
 
Table 2
Intense Combat Days & Casualties
1 October to 31 December 1944
Days Casualties
Ten British Divisions 25 12,528
Three Canadian Divisions 54 10,097
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